Tactics

From the Battle of Hastings in 1066, for the following 250 years, heavy knightly cavalry dominated European battlefields and contemporary warfare sought ways in which infantry could match the cavalry. The first sign of change were the Scottish schiltrons - circular or rectangular close-order formations of pikemen. The first recorded use of the word schiltron relates to the Battle of Falkirk on 22 July 1298. This battle also foreshadowed the development of later military art. The Scottish cavalry was very quickly scattered by the English cavalry, which subsequently also destroyed the completely unprotected Scottish archers. The isolated Scottish pikemen closed into several circular schiltrons and in this way resisted the English cavalry for some time - allegedly 111 knights' horses were killed. The situation changed when the English longbowmen came within shooting range. The circular schiltrons were static formations and the poorly armoured Scottish pikemen had nowhere to escape from the arrows. When the Scottish ranks thinned and the formations ceased to be tight and close, the English cavalry charged against them, completely breaking the Scottish formations and routing them.

An exemplary use of rectangular schiltrons and cooperation between cavalry and infantry was demonstrated by the Scots at the Battle of Bannockburn. The schiltrons were not static; on the contrary, the pikemen in close-order formations attacked the English cavalry and pushed it before them. Given the marshy terrain on both the left and right flanks, the English cavalry could not disengage and execute a flanking manoeuvre. Moreover, the clash occurred so quickly that the English longbowmen were ordered not to shoot, because they would have hit their own soldiers, whereupon they were scattered by an attack of Scottish cavalry from the left flank.

At roughly the same time, the French king Philip IV decided to subjugate Flanders, which was formally French but in practice an independent state. He won over most of the local nobility, but the Flemish cities, led by Bruges, revolted against French rule. Philip sent an imposing force of 3,000 knights and 4,000 to 5,000 infantry to suppress the uprising. Given that the Flemish nobility did not join the revolt, the Flemish army almost entirely lacked cavalry - the Flemings allegedly had only 10 horsemen at their disposal. The main burden was borne by urban militias numbering 8,000 to 10,000 men, of whom 900 were crossbowmen. These foot soldiers were well organised and well equipped - all had head protection and most of them wore mail armour. In their hands they wielded spears and goedendags - a specifically Flemish weapon. The two armies met on 11 June 1302 at Courtrai. The area around Courtrai was marshy and moreover criss-crossed by numerous canals and ditches which the Flemings had dug before the French army arrived. The Flemish army deployed in considerably deep linear formations and filled a roughly square area, whose rear was covered by a bend in the River Leie and whose front and flank were covered by smaller streams and canals. The French sent infantry to try to fill in the ditches and thus enable an attack by French cavalry, but they were driven back by the Flemish crossbowmen. The French crossbowmen then attacked the Flemish crossbowmen and drove them back. Eventually, the bolts and arrows of the French marksmen began hitting the front ranks of the main Flemish infantry formations, but caused only minor damage. The French commander did not want to let his less numerous and qualitatively inferior infantry fight on the banks of streams and canals against the Flemish enemy and feared that such a battle would prevent the deployment of his heavy cavalry. He therefore recalled the infantry to make way for 2,300 heavily armoured horsemen arranged in two formations. Even so, several of them were trampled by horses. Despite the difficulties, the French cavalry eventually managed to cross the watercourses, reformed before the Flemish formations and charged. Most of the horsemen, however, failed to break through the disciplined Flemish lines. Those who did manage to break through were surrounded by the reserve lines of the Flemings and killed.

During the first half of the 14th century, the Swiss Confederation added its successes to those of the Scots and the Flemings. At the Battle of Morgarten, the decisive factor was the terrain - Swiss foot soldiers attacked the knights of Leopold I of Habsburg as they were strung out along a narrow mountain path. By 1339 at the latest, at the Battle of Laupen, the Swiss were already deploying deep close-order formations including a circular formation called the “hedgehog (Igel)”.

The foundation of success in the aforementioned battles was well-organised and disciplined infantry capable of forming and maintaining close-order formations, combined with suitably chosen terrain. The force capable of raising, training and equipping such infantry became the cities, whose rapid development occurred precisely in the 13th century. The wealthy Flemish cities could afford to field better-equipped infantry, which stands out especially in comparison with the devastating effect of English archery on Scottish infantry at Falkirk versus the relatively ineffective shooting of the French at Courtrai.

Following the experience of the First War of Scottish Independence (1296 - 1328), the English also shifted the centre of gravity of their army to infantry. After the death of King Robert I Bruce, fighting between England and Scotland reignited in the Second War of Scottish Independence (1332 - 1357). At the Battle of Dupplin Moor on 11 August 1332, the English lined up at the end of a shallow valley. In the centre they placed close-order formations composed of pikemen and dismounted men-at-arms and on the flanks longbowmen. The Scots, confident in their numerical superiority (15,000 Scots against 1,500 English), formed up into two schiltrons and set out to meet the English. The commanders of both schiltrons - Robert Bruce, the illegitimate son of King Robert I Bruce, and Donald of Mar - competed with each other over which of them would engage the English first. The race was won by the schiltron of Robert Bruce, which struck the front of the English formation and pushed it back about 9 metres. However, the Scots had in their haste allowed themselves to be channelled by the terrain and found themselves at the bottom of the shallow valley in the crossfire of English archers on the flanks. Contemporaries report that the English longbowmen “blinded and wounded the faces” of those at the front of the schiltron. This is a very interesting piece of information, because it implies that the English longbowmen were conducting aimed, direct fire at short range. The shooting and the impact of the second schiltron into the rear of the first created chaos, during which more than a thousand warriors in the centre of the Scottish mass were suffocated without ever having engaged in the fighting at all. The battle lasted from dawn until noon, when the Scottish assault collapsed and the Scots took to flight. The English men-at-arms then mounted their own horses and pursued the fleeing Scots until sunset.

A year later, on 19 July 1333, the Battle of Halidon Hill took place, in which 15,000 Scots faced about 10,000 English. The English lined up on Halidon Hill - a flat rise about 180 metres high. The English again placed dismounted men-at-arms together with pikemen in shallow formations facing the possible directions from which one could ascend the hill. On the flanks of these formations they placed English longbowmen.
The Scots closed into their traditional schiltrons on the opposite rise. Both armies wanted to exploit their good defensive positions, but the Scots were eventually forced to attack because the nearby town of Berwick was threatened with falling. They had to descend from the hill, cross marshy terrain and climb up to the English positions on Halidon Hill. The previous Battle of Dupplin Moor had shown how vulnerable schiltrons were against longbows, so the Scots advanced through the marshy ground as quickly as they could. Even so, the longbows began to take their toll. Contemporaries report that “the Scots who marched in front were so wounded in the face and blinded by the multitude of English arrows that they could not help themselves and soon began to turn their faces from the blows of the arrows and to fall.” Despite this, the Scots managed to reach the English lines, but their schiltrons soon afterwards broke apart and the Scots took to flight. The English again mounted the horses they had kept at the rear and pursued the fleeing Scots.

The Hundred Years' War

On 24 May 1337, the Hundred Years' War between England and France broke out; however, the first major battle did not take place until 1340 at Sluys. Victory in this naval battle secured English control over the English Channel.

During 1345, Henry of Derby led a campaign at the head of an Anglo-Gascon army, in the course of which he defeated the French at the battles of Bergerac and Auberoche, captured more than 100 French towns, castles and fortresses, and thus gave the English bridgehead in Gascony strategic depth. France responded by raising an army numbering 15,000 to 20,000 men, with which the Duke of Normandy, John, set out for Gascony. Henry of Derby sent an urgent plea for help to the English king Edward III, and so on 12 July 1346 an English army landed in Normandy. The English king advanced with his army southward, on 26 July 1346 captured the capital of Normandy, Caen, and continued along the Seine valley towards Paris. Near the town of Poissy, however, he found himself in a difficult situation, as he was threatened with encirclement by the French and their allies from three sides, and so on 16 August 1346 he headed north to link up with his allies in Flanders. The French set off in pursuit of the English, and on 26 August 1346 a clash occurred near the village of Crécy.

The English deployed on a sloping hill, broken up by groves and terraces, as they were accustomed from the British Isles - dismounted men-at-arms and pikemen blocked the direct approaches to the hill and on their flanks were English longbowmen. The right flank of Edward's army was protected by the River Maye, the forest of Crécy and Crécy itself, while the left flank was anchored against the village of Wadicourt, which prevented the French from easily flanking them. An innovation compared to the wars with Scotland was the use of improvised fortifications in the form of pit traps, intended to hinder an attack, especially by cavalry.

The French vanguard came upon the English positions around noon. A few smaller engagements were fought on the march. After reconnoitring the English positions, a council of war was held at which senior French commanders, confident of victory, recommended an attack, but not until the following day, so that the French army could rest after the demanding march and so that additional allies, such as the Duke of Savoy with five hundred men, could arrive. Despite this advice, the French attacked later that same day. From contemporary sources it is not clear whether this was Philip's deliberate decision or was forced upon him as more and more French knights pressed forward. Philip's plan was to use the Genoese crossbowmen to disrupt the English formations, which was to enable the French cavalry to penetrate the English lines and shatter them - a practical approach that had already proved itself at the Battle of Falkirk and was used with success until the mid-18th century. This plan also again suggests that the effective range at which English longbowmen and crossbowmen actually shot was similar.

According to Philip's plan, the Genoese crossbowmen advanced late in the afternoon and fought a shooting duel with the English longbowmen. Working particularly against them was the absence of pavises, which had not reached the battlefield and remained in the French baggage train. Despite the three times higher rate of fire of the English longbowmen, the Genoese managed to fire about two volleys before they began to retreat. At this point their losses were probably not significant, but the French knights regarded the retreat as treachery and began slaughtering the Genoese, heedless of the continuing English archery.

The detachment of knights that was massacring the retreating Genoese simultaneously launched a mounted charge against the English positions. This attack was largely improvised and uncoordinated. The horsemen had to force their way uphill through muddy terrain past fleeing Genoese. The attack was further broken up by the strong and effective shooting of the English longbowmen. It is probable that the longbowmen opened fire only when they were certain of hitting their targets, which was at about 50 metres. English longbows did not penetrate the plate armour of the French knights, but they killed and wounded their horses in large numbers, and many French knights were crushed beneath their horses or trampled and suffocated in the mud. When the French charge reached the English pikemen and dismounted men-at-arms, it no longer had sufficient momentum.

Fresh French forces moved to the foot of the hill and repeated the charge, which suffered the same problems as the previous one and was further hindered by the fact that the ground was already strewn with the corpses of men and horses. Even so, the French reached the English positions and close-quarters fighting erupted. King Edward even had to send a detachment of reserves to save the situation. French attacks continued with the same results until midnight, when the main body of the French army withdrew. Nevertheless, the following morning French reinforcements continued to arrive on the battlefield, but the English, now mounted, surrounded and pursued them. King Philip himself was wounded, struck by an arrow in the jaw. This would correspond with the tactics of English longbowmen from the Scottish wars, when aimed fire was directed from relatively close range at the faces of the enemy.

The Battle of Poitiers

Almost exactly 10 years after Crécy, on 19 September 1356, another significant battle of the Hundred Years' War took place - the Battle of Poitiers. Here the Anglo-Gascon army, numbering altogether about 6,000 men, faced the French army of about 14,000 men. The Anglo-Gascon force consisted of 3,000 mounted men-at-arms, 2,000 English and Welsh longbowmen and 1,000 Gascon foot soldiers, many of whom were armed with crossbows. The French army was composed of 10,000 mounted men-at-arms, 2,000 crossbowmen and 2,000 infantry. The English and Gascons divided into three battalions: the one on the left flank was commanded by Thomas of Warwick, Marshal of England and a veteran of the Battle of Crécy. It contained a thousand mounted men-at-arms, now dismounted, and a thousand longbowmen who stood to the left of the men-at-arms. The right flank was commanded by William of Salisbury and consisted, like the left flank, of a thousand dismounted men-at-arms and a thousand longbowmen standing to the right. The last battalion was commanded by the Black Prince himself and consisted of 1,000 dismounted men-at-arms and 1,000 Gascon foot soldiers. Initially this battalion was placed in the rear as a reserve. A French flanking manoeuvre was prevented by the River Miosson on the left flank and the forest of Nouaillé in the rear of the English positions.

The majority of the French army also fought on foot. Only about 500 horsemen remained mounted. It was divided into 4 battalions: the foremost was led by the French Constable, Walter of Brienne. Besides a numerous core of French men-at-arms, it included 200 Scottish men-at-arms, most of the French infantry and crossbowmen, and all the cavalry. The second battalion consisted exclusively of 4,000 dismounted men-at-arms. The third battalion had the same composition and numbered about 3,200 men, and the last, fourth, battalion consisted of two thousand dismounted men-at-arms.

The English slept at or near their defensive positions. The French deployed in battle order shortly after dawn, about 500 metres from the English positions. After the two armies had faced each other for about 2 hours, the French noticed movement in the English army, mistakenly believed it to be a retreat and launched their attack. Two groups of French cavalry attacked the longbowmen on the English flanks. The French planned to first eliminate the English longbowmen, while their own crossbowmen were to provide covering fire. The longbowmen on the English left flank, however, were deployed on the edge of a marsh and the terrain made it impossible for the French cavalry to engage them. The longbowmen in turn discovered that their shooting was ineffective against French armour. The French horsemen were using a hot novelty - plate barding for their horses. The longbowmen therefore redirected their fire at the supporting crossbowmen and drove them into retreat. Part of the English longbowmen, however, went around the marsh to get behind the French - the barding protected the horses only at the front. This detachment of French cavalry thus suffered losses and withdrew.

The French mounted detachment on the English right flank advanced more cautiously, only a few paces ahead of the dismounted men-at-arms. Here the English were hidden behind a hedge, in which there was a gap through which four horses could comfortably ride abreast. The French therefore attacked this gap and despite heavy fire clashed with the English defenders in it, and fierce close-quarters fighting erupted. However, it was possible to direct more effective fire at the closely-packed and fighting horsemen, and moreover the English had a great numerical advantage, and so this detachment too was forced to retreat with heavy losses. Then the English longbowmen turned against the French crossbowmen, pushed them back and subsequently the entire 1st battalion as well.

The French who survived the first attack were not pursued, because the second French battalion was already approaching the English positions, and it vigorously attacked with a strength of 4,000 men. The French attack was disrupted by the sustained fire of the English longbowmen as it advanced through the retreating soldiers from the first battalion, yet the French managed to reach the English positions and close-quarters fighting erupted. The battle lasted roughly two hours, and the more flexible English command was evident as commanders redeployed their men to close the gaps that appeared in the defence. The Black Prince was forced to commit almost all his reserves, but in the end the exhausted French withdrew in good order.

The commander of the third battalion, the Duke of Orléans, most likely interpreted the orderly withdrawal of the second division as a general retreat and left the battle with half of his battalion and many survivors from the first two attacks. Of the men remaining in the third battalion, a large part joined King John's detachment in the rear and the rest launched a feeble attack on the English positions.

The fourth battalion, led by King John II, had 2,000 men-at-arms at the start of the battle, but survivors from the previous three attacks gradually joined it, so the fourth attack was probably launched with a strength of around 4,000 men. The English and Gascons had most likely not expected another attack, and when they saw that the French were formed up for a new assault under the unfurled Oriflamme banner, some of them began leaving the battlefield. The Black Prince dispatched a small detachment of about 160 men who were to ride around the French positions on horseback, fall upon the French rear and create confusion. However, the sight of a detachment of horsemen riding away from the battle further undermined morale in the Anglo-Gascon army. The Black Prince gave the order for a general advance, which somewhat restored morale, and the English set out towards the French. The fighting began with an exchange of fire between the English longbowmen and the French crossbowmen, who were now at an advantage because they could shelter behind pavises. After the morning's fighting, the English were also running low on arrows, yet they held on until the French crossbowmen parted ranks to let the French men-at-arms through. The French soon began to gain the upper hand, when the English detachment arrived unnoticed in the French rear. A hundred longbowmen dismounted and opened fire, while the remaining 60 horsemen charged the French. The men in the rear French ranks thought they were surrounded and gradually broke into flight, which in turn swept away most of the French army. The rest, with the king at their head, were pushed into a bend of the River Miosson, where they surrendered.

Western European armies and their commanders thus learned several principles and procedures during the 14th century that would remain valid for several subsequent centuries:

1. To withstand a cavalry charge by forming and maintaining a close-order formation.
2. To support their formations by choosing suitable terrain - particularly for English tactics, the terrain was a highly determining factor.
3. To disrupt the enemy's formation with sustained missile fire.
4. To use cavalry for rapid manoeuvres and flanking movements instead of simple frontal charges.

The situation in the Bohemian Lands

The 14th century in Bohemia was a period of exceptionally long peace. Nevertheless, even here we can trace, through indirect evidence, the growing role of infantry recruited primarily from the urban environment. One source is the inventories of municipal armouries. The oldest surviving evidence of a municipal armoury is considered to be the inventory of the town of Stříbro from 1362. The town held in its possession 12 crossbows and 12 gorgets, which were stored at the town hall. In addition, each of the town representatives held several pieces of armour and crossbows, and further equipment was entrusted to 15 other burghers.
The inventory from Stříbro is followed by an inventory from Kolín from 1381, which lists 54 swords, 63 crossbows, 63 helmets and 52 pieces of armour.

In 1362, Emperor Charles IV also issued a decree ordering royal towns to maintain a specified quantity of arms, part of which came from the ruler while the remainder was to be purchased by the towns at their own expense. The armour that the king procured in Nuremberg and Sulzbach was brought to Bohemia and subsequently distributed to the royal towns during 1362 and 1363. Of the 27 to 28 towns that received armour, one can name, for example, Hradec Králové, Plzeň, Kolín, Poliçka, Vysoké Mýto, Domažlice, Beroun and others. Wroclaw together with 3 other castles received a portion of this equipment in 1370, when war with Poland threatened. Plzeň, for instance, received 388 breastplates, 330 bevors, 310 vambraces, 20 upper arm defences for the shoulders and 20 collars.

Towards the end of the 14th century, the Margraves' Wars broke out in Moravia between the Moravian margraves Jobst and Prokop of the Luxembourg dynasty, who were alternately supported by their other Luxembourg relatives, the Bohemian king Wenceslas IV and the Hungarian king Sigismund. The wars had the character of petty daily warfare and sieges of the opponent's fortified positions. The definitive end to the Margraves' Wars was the unsuccessful six-week siege of Znojmo in July and August 1404 by the army of Sigismund of Luxembourg and Albert IV of Austria, during which both rulers contracted dysentery and Albert succumbed to it on 14 September 1404 in Vienna.

However, the Czechs also gained military experience abroad. In 1394, Pope Boniface IX proclaimed another crusade against the Turks. The crusade had extensive international participation including Czechs, though the most numerous nations in it were the French and the Hungarians. Disputes between the French and the other nations accompanied the crusade throughout its duration. On 25 September 1396, at Nicopolis, besieged by the crusaders, a fateful clash took place. The Turks formed up on a nearby plateau in order to come to the aid of the encircled town. Sigismund proposed waiting two hours until his scouts determined the size of the Turkish army, but the undisciplined French accused him of trying to rob them of glory and charged, while the Hungarians and other nations remained at the town under Sigismund's command. The French charge crushed the untrained infantry that the Turks had placed in the first line and struck the elite Janissaries, whose position was protected by sharpened stakes driven into the ground with the points facing the enemy. (The English similarly used sharpened stakes to protect their longbowmen against French cavalry in the later Battle of Agincourt.) The French drove back the Janissaries, but half the knights either lost their horses or were forced to dismount. Some older knights suggested that the French should consolidate their forces and wait until the other allies took up positions from which they could support the French attack, but they were outvoted by younger knights who believed they had defeated the main Turkish forces. They therefore pushed uphill, but when they reached the plateau, fresh sipahi forces struck them. A battle broke out from which part of the French fled and those who remained alive surrendered. While the French were advancing uphill, the sipahis flanked them on both sides and attacked the rest of the Christian army. Sigismund's part of the army fought bravely to avoid encirclement, but was ultimately defeated, and Sigismund himself escaped only barely on a fishing boat to Venetian ships on the Danube.

Even though